Transparency: Bridge Guy video release
The attorneys representing Mr. Allen continue to receive a considerable number of inquiries and requests for access to public records and exhibits related to State of Indiana v. Richard Allen.
Recognizing the significant public interest and in the spirit of transparency, this site releases the original "Bridge Guy" video, as extracted from Liberty German's phone and provided to Richard Allen's defense, below. We may provide additional information and exhibits in the future. All information is and will be provided in accordance with the Indiana Rules on Access to Court Records and Indiana Code 5-14-3.
"Bridge Guy" - 43-Second Video
This is a compressed-for-web version of the full 43 second video obtained directly via the extraction performed on Liberty German's iPhone 6s by Sgt. Brian Bunner on February 15, 2017.
NOTE: The metadata on this embedded video reflects the metadata after compression, not the original video extracted from Liberty German's phone.
Video file analysis & metadata
The video file analyzed was 67d1fb2d47a8a.MOV, as received directly from the extraction performed on the phone by Department for Homeland Security/Indiana State Police. We examined it the day we received it for publication, in March 2025, using four independent tools: FFprobe, mp4info, mp4dump, and ExifTool.
The forensic results below refer to the original extracted file, not the compressed-for-web copy embedded above.
The results are internally consistent with a video recorded on an Apple iPhone 6s running iOS 10.2. The file contains the expected Apple QuickTime structure, H.264 video, AAC audio, iPhone metadata, location information, and portrait-orientation data. The analysis found no obvious indicators of re-encoding, splicing, or post-production editing.
These findings support the conclusion that the file is consistent with a recording made directly on an iPhone 6s in February 2017.
What we found
| Finding | What it means |
|---|---|
| Approximately 43.33-second runtime | The audio and video tracks agree on the duration. |
| 1920×1080 H.264 video | The resolution, High Profile Level 4.0 codec, and approximately 29.97 frames per second are consistent with typical iPhone 6s video. |
| AAC mono audio at 44.1 kHz | The audio format and approximately 88 Kbps bitrate are consistent with the same recording. |
| Apple QuickTime container | The qt major and compatible brands are consistent with an Apple-produced MOV file. |
| Apple iPhone 6s and iOS 10.2 metadata | The embedded device and software information match the claimed recording device and period. |
| Creation date | The embedded creation time is approximately . |
| Embedded location | The file contains the Apple QuickTime location tag +40.5819-086.6665+180.315/, approximately 40.5819° N, 86.6665° W, at an altitude of approximately 180.315 metres. |
| Portrait rotation metadata | The 90-degree rotation tag is consistent with a vertically held iPhone. |
| No third-party software markers | The metadata identifies Apple Core Media rather than common editing or transcoding software such as FFmpeg, iMovie, or Adobe Premiere. |
What tampering might have looked like
If the video had been exported or re-encoded by another application, we might expect to see a different software or handler name, a different container brand, altered codec settings, missing phone metadata, or changes to the track structure.
If the video had been spliced, we might look for discontinuities in timestamps, mismatched audio and video durations, unusual sample tables, abrupt changes in encoding parameters, or structural irregularities in the MOV container.
We specifically looked at and analyzed the MOV container and its component parts, as this isn't editable metadata in the way some metadata can be. Defects in these parts of the file, which would be artifacts left over from many kinds of video tampering, are impossible to hide in a Quicktime/MOV format video. This video contains no such defects.
The tests performed here did not identify those common indicators. That does not rule out every possible form of manipulation, but it means the file does not exhibit the ordinary technical footprints we would expect from editing or transcoding.
How the analysis was performed
The following sections describe what each tool examined and provide the commands needed to reproduce the analysis. The tools must be installed separately; the filename or path should be adjusted if the file is stored elsewhere.
FFprobe: tracks, codecs, timing, and metadata
FFprobe showed 1920×1080 H.264 High Profile Level 4.0 video at approximately 15.5 Mbps and 29.97 frames per second. It showed AAC LC mono audio at 44.1 kHz and approximately 88 Kbps, along with two Apple mebx metadata tracks. The creation time was approximately 2017-02-13T19:13:52Z, and the file contained the Apple QuickTime location tag and a portrait rotation tag.
ffprobe -v quiet -show_format -show_streams -print_format json 67d1fb2d47a8a.MOVThis matters because the codec, bitrate, track layout, and Apple metadata are consistent with standard iPhone output. There was no reference to third-party editing software.
mp4info: container and track summary
mp4info identified qt as both the major brand and compatible brand. It reported the approximately 43.33-second duration, 1920×1080 H.264 video at approximately 15.51 Mbps, and AAC audio at approximately 88 Kbps. It also showed that “fast start” was not enabled, meaning the moov atom was likely at the end of the file, which is common for older iPhone recordings.
mp4info 67d1fb2d47a8a.MOVA file re-wrapped or changed by other software might instead show container brands such as mp42 or isom. The QuickTime structure here is consistent with an Apple MOV file.
mp4dump: internal MOV atom structure
mp4dump showed the expected ftyp, wide, mdat, and moov atoms. The media data was approximately 85 MB. The movie metadata contained separate video, audio, and Apple metadata tracks, including mebx blocks used for location and other iPhone metadata. The sample tables were consistent with continuous recording and did not show an obvious structural break.
mp4dump 67d1fb2d47a8a.MOVUnusual or duplicate atoms, leftover references to editing software, or inconsistent track structures could indicate that a file had been re-wrapped or processed. None were identified in this examination.
ExifTool: camera, software, date, rotation, and GPS
ExifTool reported an embedded creation date of 2017:02:13 19:13:52Z, make and model of Apple iPhone 6s, software version 10.2, portrait rotation information, and GPS coordinates of approximately 40° 34′ 54.84″ N, 86° 39′ 59.40″ W at an altitude of approximately 180.315 metres.
exiftool 67d1fb2d47a8a.MOVIf a video had been heavily edited or transcoded, the original camera and software fields might be missing or replaced by information identifying the editing application. The presence of valid, consistently formatted Apple metadata supports the file’s claimed origin, but does not by itself prove that the metadata was never copied or modified.
What this analysis cannot establish
This examination analyzes the file as received. It does not by itself independently establish the original phone, the person who recorded it, the complete chain of custody, or whether an identical replacement file could have been substituted before examination.
However, leading digital forensics expert Stacy Eldridge assessed that, in her opinion, the video came from the phone, which she discusses in the interview below.
Interview with Stacy Eldridge, the Defense Digital Forensics Expert
If you want to know more about this video and the digital forensics performed on Liberty German's cellphone more broadly, the defense's digital forensics expert - Stacy Eldridge - gave an interview to the Defense Diaries YouTube channel in March 2025, in which she discusses her methodology, findings, opinions, and limitations.